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The Politics of Peace: An Evaluation of Arms Conrols
$18.07
Book
THE POLITICS OF PEACE
An Evaluation of Arms Control
John H. Barton
Published in 1981
As practiced in the last two decades, arms control can provide some, but only very limited, help in maintaining peace; this is the conclusion that emerges from this evaluation of the capabilities and limitations of arms control. Substantial reductions in weapons am extremely desirable, but the author suggests that the current
arms control approach is politically unable to produce such reductions, as confirmed by the SALT negotiations and the withdrawal of the draft SALT II treaty.
After reaching this pessimistic judgment, the author considers possible changes in the arms control process. He carefully examines the problem of enforcement and finds that traditional concepts of large-scale international military forces am likely to be of little help, but that less dramatic procedures based on public opinion or on very constrained use of force are likely to be much more beneficial. He then reviews possible arms control applications to identify situations in which this favorable interplay can be achieved. The resulting new arms control agenda includes international organization reform, new kinds of expert groups, and new forms of international military consultation. For all these innovations the author suggests politically plausible first steps.
John H. Barton is Professor of Law at Stanford
University, and is co-editor of International
Arms Control: Issues and Agreements
This is a reproduction edition from a scanned copy of the original work.
Title: The Politics of Peace: An Evaluation of Arms Control
Author: John H. Barton
Publisher: Stanford University Press 1981
ISBN 0804710813
Contents
Background: The Sources of War and Peace 1
The Initiation of War 15
International Law and Arms Control 44
Entry into Arms Control Agreements 67
The Impact of Contemporary Arms Control 105
Multilateral Techniques of Enforcing Arms Control 127
SALT and the Control of Bilateral Nuclear Deterrence 148
Regional Arms Control 175
Global Arms Control 200
Conclusions 219
International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements
$23.68
Book
This is a reproduction edition from the 1976 publication.
This is an exhaustive analysis of national and international arms control: its history, philosophy, cultural context, technology, economic and political ramifications, achievements, and future prospects. The book reflects the combined contributions of the Stanford Arms Control Group, an interdisciplinary group of nearly twenty faculty members who have been jointly teaching an undergraduate arms control course at Stanford University since 1971.
The book will assist the general reader in understanding and forming intelligent opinions on such issues as the role of doctrine in military strategy, the difficulties posed by rapidly changing technology, and the value limitations of arms control as a way to prevent war. It is also designed as supplementary reading for courses in international relations, diplomatic history, and foreign policy.
An appendix contains the text of eighteen major arms control agreements. The volume concludes with discussion questions and suggestions for further reading.
John H. Barton is Professor of Law at Stanford University. Lawrence D. Weiler is
Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.
This is a reproduction edition based on a scanned copy of the original work:
Title International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements
Authors Stanford Arms Control Group, John H. Barton, Lawrence D. Weiler
Editors John H. Barton, Lawrence D. Weiler
Publisher Stanford University Press, 1976
ISBN 0804709211, 9780804709217
Length 444 pages
The Stanford Arms Control Group:
John H. Barton, Richard Brody, Gordon A. Craig, Alexander Dallin, Sidney D. Drell, Donald Dunn, Thomas Ehrlich, Alexander L. George, Joshua Lederberg, John W. Lewis, Robert D. North, Wolfgang Panofsky, Peter Paret, Henry Rowen, Jan Triska, Lawrence D. Weiler, Franklin B. Weinstein
Invited Participants in the Review Conference at Stanford, August 1974:
Anne Cahn, Steven Canby, Albert Carnesale, Harold Feiveson, Leslie Fishbone, Ralph Goldman, James Gustin, Roman Kolkowicz, Joseph Kruzel, George Quester, Eric Stein, Samuel Williamson
Contents
Introduction 1
Arms Control: Cultural Context and Motivations 9
Modern Disarmament Efforts Before World War II 31
The Changing Nature of Strategic Weapons 46
An Overview of the Negotiations Since World War II 66
Agreements and Treaties Other than SALT and the NPT 94
Strategic Doctrine 123
The Institutions of Arms Control 151
The Negotiation of SALT I 172
SALT, 1972-1975 208
The Economics of Arms and Arms Control 228
Regional Arms Control: The European Example 249
Control of Conventional Arms 271
Control of Nuclear Proliferation 288
Towards an Evaluation of Arms Control: Unanswered Questions 310
Appendixes 323
Discussion Questions 419
Suggested Further Readings 425
Arms Control by Committee : Managing Negotiations with the Russians
$22.12
Book
This book is essentially a series of case stories of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, as seen from the American side. It describes the processes of governmental decisionmaking for arms control in Washington, D.C., and the techniques for joint U.S.-Soviet decisionmaking at the negotiating table.
As general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and member of U.S. delegations to disarmament conferences for eight years, the author was in a unique position to assess the difficulties of fashioning an arms control treaty that could pass muster within the executive branch of the U.S. government, be approved by U.S. allies, be successfully negotiated with the Soviets, and then win the approval of the U.S. Senate. This process will be even more complex now that the United States will face at least four nuclear powers from the former U.S.S.R.
The book has three purposes. The first is to add to the recorded history of the following negotiations: the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the ABM Treaty of 1972 and its companion SALT Interim Agreements, and the 1987 INF Treaty. The author asks in each case: What did the president and his assistants do (or fail to do) to negotiate a successful agreement?
The second purpose is to use the case book approach, common in law schools and business schools, as a teaching device for those who wish to learn how the American government made decisions about arms control negotiations, how U.S.-Soviet negotiators reached decisions, and what the results of the decisions have been.
The book’s third purpose is to generalize about what works and what does not work in the complex world of arms control negotiations, including information on the impact of negotiating committees and comparisons of the process for negotiating arms limits through action and reaction, without written agreement. The concluding chapter looks to the future: What changes will occur in the arms control process given the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union?
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL
George Bunn was the first general counsel for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA: 1961-1969), helped negotiate the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and later became U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. He has taught at the U.S. Naval War College and the University of Wisconsin Law School, and served as dean of that law school. In his almost twenty years as a Washington lawyer, he worked for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and a major Washington law firm, as well as for ACDA. For the last twenty years, he has been at CISAC. He has a degree in electrical engineering from the University of Wisconsin and a Bachelor of Laws from Columbia University.
Among Bunn's research on the nuclear non-proliferation regime based upon the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a book, Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians (Stanford University Press, 1992), a negotiator's history of the negotiation of important provisions of the NPT, as well as commentary on other negotiations. He has written many articles relating to the NPT and its regime.
In addition he has written extensively on other aspects of nuclear proliferation and arms control, such as the theory and practice of achieving arms control including non-treaty methods, and the physical protection of nuclear material from theft and sabotage. Recently his articles have appeared in Arms Control Today, The Nonproliferation Review, Science and Global Security, IAEA Bulletin, and Disarmament Diplomacy.
In 2006, he completed (as an author and coeditor) U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Nonproliferation: Confronting Today's Threats. The book address the role nuclear weapons should play in today's world, and how the United States can promote international security while safeguarding its own interests.
This is a reproduction edition of a scanned original for Stanford University Press.
